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Abstract
Weizs acker (2010) estimates the payo of actions to test rational expectations and to measure the
success of social learning in information cascade experiments. He concludes that participants perform
poorly when learning from others and that rational expectations are violated. We show that his
estimated payos rely on estimates of the publicly known prior and signal qualities which may lead the
formulated test of rational expectations to generate false positives. We rely on the true values of the
prior and signal qualities to estimate the payo of actions. We conrm that the rational expectations
hypothesis is rejected, but we measure a much larger success of social learning.
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Weizs acker (2010)|henceforth W|presents an appealing reduced-form approach to measure the success
of social learning in information cascade experiments. The payo of actions is estimated and the resulting
estimate is controlled for in regression analyses to assess the extent to which participants respond to
incentives and to formulate a test of rational expectations. W concludes that participants perform
poorly when trying to extract the information that is contained in previous actions and that rational
expectations are violated in several systematic ways.
In this comment, we rst show that the formulated test of rational expectations might generate false
positives. The reason is that players with rational expectations assess the payo of actions conditional on
the true parameter values of the information structure, but the estimate of the payo of actions presented
in W relies on estimates of those parameters. Second, we report the results of regression analyses identical
to those performed in W except that the estimate of the payo of actions incorporates the true values of
information parameters. We conrm that the rational expectations hypothesis is rejected, but we nd that
participants' biased tendency to follow own signal is less pronounced than suggested by W. The fraction
of optimal choice earnings participants receive is comparable in situations where they should follow others
and in situations where they should follow private information. Our improved measure of the success
of social learning also indicates that participants make better inferences along equilibrium-path histories
not because the public information is easy to interpret but because it is more valuable.
The remainder of the comment is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a decomposition of
the empirical payo of actions presented in W and we show that the formulated test of rational expec-
tations might generate false positives. An alternative estimate of the payo of actions straightforwardly
derives from the decomposition. Section 3 measures the success of social learning in information cascade
experiments based on the alternative estimate of the payo of actions. We conclude with a few remarks
in Section 4. All appendices can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
2 Empirical Payo of Actions in Information Cascade Experiments
To facilitate the exposition of our results, we rst provide some formal details about the considered class
of information cascade games. Second, we report the main dierences between the meta-dataset presented
in W and our meta-dataset (henceforth the W and the ZMK meta-dataset, respectively). Third, we
decompose the estimate of the (normalized) monetary payo of actions presented in W which claries
why testing rational expectations with the help of this estimate might generate false positives.
2.1 A Class of Information Cascade Games
In (almost) all information cascade experiments, participants interact repeatedly with each other and
play a nitely repeated version of the cascade game. W assumes that, in any repetition of the stage
game, players choose actions which are independent of history of play in previous repetitions. Players
act as if their repeated interactions with other players were isolated interactions meaning that learning
across repetitions as well as the prospect of future interactions are neglected. We therefore restrict our
formal exposition to the one-shot version of the information cascade game.
There are two payo-relevant states of Nature (henceforth states)|state A and state B, and two
possible actions|\predict state A" simply denoted by A and \predict state B" simply denoted by B.
Nature chooses state A with probability p  1=2. The nite set of players is f1;:::;Ng with generic
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Nature moves rst and chooses a state which remains unknown to the players. Each player is then
endowed with a private signal which corresponds to the realization of a random variable, denoted by ~ sn,
whose support is given by S, with 1 >j S j> 1, and whose distribution depends on the state. Conditional
on the state, private signals are independently distributed across players. In state A (resp. state B),
player n receives signal sn 2 S with probability 0 < qn (sn j A) < 1 (resp. 0 < qn (sn j B) < 1) where
P
S qn (sn j A) =
P
S qn (sn j B) = 1. For each player n, the signal structure is a two-column matrix
Qn 2 Q whose rows consist of two-element vectors (qn (s j A);qn (s j B)), with s 2 S, and such that no
two rows are identical.
Each player then makes a once-in-a-lifetime binary decision. Time is discrete, t = 1;2;:::;T, and in
each period t there are kt  1 players who simultaneously choose one of the two actions. The order in
which players take their actions is exogenously specied with
PT
t=1 kt = N. At the beginning of each
period t  2, the action as well as the signal structure of exactly one of the players who acted in the
previous period is made public. Accordingly, a player who acts in period t 2 f1;:::;Tg observes the
history ht = ((a1;Q1);:::;(at 1;Qt 1)) 2 Ht = ffA;Bg  Qgt 1 where (a;Q) is the player's action
and signal structure which is public in period  2 f1;:::;t   1g, and h1 = ;.
In Appendix A we derive the choice probabilities in quantal response equilibrium models assuming
that, for all players, action A has vN-M payos u(A;A) = 1 and u(A;B) = 0, and action B has vN-M
payos u(B;A) = 0 and u(B;B) = 1.
2.2 A New Meta-Dataset of Information Cascade Experiments
We compiled a new meta-dataset whose main dierences with the W meta-dataset are as follows.1
On the one hand, the ZMK meta-dataset excludes the incomplete repetitions from K ubler and
Weizs acker (2004) (they amount to 242 observations), all 161 observations from Cipriani and Guarino
(2005), and the 510 observations of one interrupted and two pilot sessions from Dominitz and Hung
(2009). In the \no cost" treatment of K ubler and Weizs acker (2004), participants are not automatically
endowed with a private signal. The underlying cascade game includes an additional stage for players at
which they are asked whether they want to obtain a signal. For the sake of simplicity, the theoretical
choice probabilities of Section 2.3 are derived under the assumption that rationality incorporates an
admissibility requirement|that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies|in the additional stage.
Accordingly, only repetitions where all six participants ask for a signal are included in our meta-dataset.
Cipriani and Guarino (2005) implement a cascade game with three possible actions, so that assessing
the extent to which participants respond to incentives requires knowledge about their risk attitudes.
Since we do not possess this knowledge, we exclude the entire dataset. Data from early sessions with
dierent experimental procedures as well as data from one disrupted session have been excluded from
the statistical analysis in Dominitz and Hung (2009). We only include the 1,760 observations analyzed
by Dominitz and Hung in our meta-dataset.
On the other hand, the ZMK meta-dataset includes all 1,440 observations from Ziegelmeyer, Koessler,
Bracht, and Winter (2010) as well as the 1,080 individual observations from the PIT treatment of Fahr
and Irlenbusch (2011).
Our meta-dataset contains a total of 30,683 decisions made by 2,948 participants in 13 information
cascade experiments, and it shares approximately 95 percent of its content with the W meta-dataset.
1Though other dierences between the two meta-datasets exist, they are minor. A more detailed account of how the
ZMK meta-dataset has been built is available from the authors upon request.
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dataset.
2.3 Decomposition of the Empirical Payo of Actions
We now describe how the empirical payo of actions presented in W can be decomposed as a function of
estimates of choice probabilities and estimates of the prior and signal qualities. For the sake of exposition,
the decomposition displayed below does not take the A/B symmetry into account and we restrict ourselves
to cascade games where N = T. Appendix C completes the description and provides the intermediate
steps of the dierent decompositions.
A meta-dataset of information cascade experiments can be represented by a matrix with as many rows
as there are participants' choices. We denote by R the total number of participants' choices. Each row
1  r  R comprises a vector of variable realizations that describe the participant's decision situation in
the current period of a particular repetition of an experimental treatment.2 An experimental treatment





, the number of repetitions
(with randomly changing exogenous ordering between the repetitions), the experimental environment (set
of instructions, payment scheme, location, etc), and the participant pool. A repetition is characterized
by a state of Nature ! 2 fA;Bg and a prole of signal realizations s = (s1;s2;:::;sN) 2 SN. In each
period, the participant's decision situation additionally consists of the history h 2 [T
t=1Ht observed by
the participant and her chosen action a 2 fA;Bg.
Let R(E;!;s;h;a) = jf1  r  R j Er = E;!r = !;sr = s;hr = h;ar = a;gj denote the number of
rows in the data matrix having E as experimental treatment, ! as state of Nature, s as signal realizations,
h as history, and a as chosen action. In period t 2 T of treatment E where history ht 2 Ht is observed
and the signal realization of the player about to choose an action is st 2 S, the estimated payo of
contradicting own signal presented in W is dened by































































where sjst 2 SN
jst is a prole of signal realizations such that the signal realization of the player deciding
in period t is st, a 2 fA;Bg, ! 2 fA;Bg, and I denotes the indicator function.
2Additional variable realizations not related to the decision situation|e.g. group or session IDs|facilitate the data
analysis.
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is the consistent estimate of Pr(a j s;h) at state !, and the empirical
public likelihood ratio is assumed equal to one in the rst period. Our decomposition shows that the
accuracy with which the payo of contradicting own signal is estimated in W not only depends on the
accuracy with which choice probabilities are estimated, but it also depends on the accuracy with which
the prior and signal qualities are estimated.3 Accordingly, the larger the dierences between estimates
and true values of information parameters the less exact a measure of the success of social learning which
is based on the empirical payo of actions presented in W. Appendix D reports estimates of the prior
and the signal qualities in the ZMK meta-dataset, the latter diering markedly from the true parameter
values even at regular histories.
Another benet of our decomposition is the suggestion of an alternative estimate of the payo of
contradicting own signal. For a given treatment E, the empirical payo of contradicting own signal
could incorporate the true parameter values of the prior and signal qualities in the underlying cascade
game rather than their corresponding estimates. We refer to the former empirical payo as the \partial"
estimate of the payo of contradicting own signal and to the latter empirical payo as the \full" estimate of
the payo of contradicting own signal. Relying either on the partial or the full empirical payo of actions
to test rational expectations in information cascade experiments may produce divergent conclusions, as
illustrated below.
Using the ZMK meta-dataset, we compute both estimates of the theoretical payo of contradict-
ing own signal where empirical choice probabilities are replaced with corresponding theoretical choice
probabilities generated according to the logit quantal response equilibrium (LQRE).4 Figure 1 plots the
empirical payo of contradicting own signal against the theoretical probability to contradict own signal












> 10, each subgure contains a black
and a grey bubble. X-values of black and grey bubbles are given by the partial and full estimates of
the payo of contradicting own signal, respectively. Y -values of bubbles are given by the theoretical
probabilities to contradict own signal associated with the pairs (ht;st), and the size of bubbles re
ects
3For example, the estimated payo of contradicting own signal in the rst period might be strictly greater than one-half
for a given experimental treatment though according to the information structure of the underlying game following private
information is always benecial. Four experimental treatments contained both in the W and the ZMK meta-dataset produce
such misleading estimates.
4In line with the notation of Appendix A and for a given   0, c Pr(a j !;s;h),  2 f1;:::;t 1g and ! 2 fA;Bg, are
replaced by the corresponding 
 (a j s;h) for every triple (E;ht;st) in the ZMK meta-dataset.
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an intercept, and linear, squared, and cubed terms of the full estimate of the payo of contradicting own
signal.
(a)  = 1:5 (b)  = 15
Note: 358 distinct values of (E;ht;st) and 16,022 individual observations in total.
FIGURE 1: Probability to Contradict Own Signal in LQRE
The full estimate of the payo of contradicting own signal suggests that players in LQRE do not
have a correct perception of the available information. Averaging across all observations where the full
estimate is strictly greater than 1/2, the theoretical probability of optimal choice is 0.47 and 0.61 for
 = 1:5 and 15, respectively (for the complementary observations, the average theoretical probability of
optimal choice is 0.65 and 0.94, respectively). Regression lines reach the level of one-half at full estimates
of the payo strictly greater than one-half (approximately 0.66 and 0.56 for  = 1:5 and 15, respectively)
giving the impression that players largely fail to contradict their signal when it is slightly benecial to do
so. In contrast, black bubbles are distributed along a symmetric S-shaped line which passes through (0.5,
0.5) since, for any triple (E;ht;st), the partial estimate matches the theoretical payo of contradicting
own signal. For the sake of comparison, averaging across all observations where the partial estimate is
strictly greater than 1/2, the theoretical probability of optimal choice is 0.56 and 0.88 for  = 1:5 and 15,
respectively (for the complementary observations, the average theoretical probability of optimal choice is
0.64 and 0.96, respectively).5
Players with rational expectations assess the payo of actions conditional on the true values of infor-
mation parameters not on their estimates. For this reason, using the full estimate of the payo of actions
to test rational expectations in information cascade experiments might generate false positives.
3 Improved Measure of the Success of Social Learning
The previous section shows that estimates of the payo of actions in information cascade experiments
should rely on the true values of the prior and signal qualities so that empirical choice probabilities are
5The inaccuracy of the full estimate of the payo of actions is clearly re
ected in its range. For each , the full estimate
of the payo of contradicting own signal takes any value between 0 and 1. Theoretical payos of contradicting own signal
lie between 0.07 and 0.68 for  = 1:5, and they lie between 0.05 and 0.78 for  = 15.
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described in W except that we use the partial estimate of the payo of actions as a control variable and
that we rely on the ZMK meta-dataset. In Appendix E we provide background information for the
analyses and we also discuss the statistical results obtained by using the full estimate of the payo of
actions as a control variable. Appendix F replicates all analyses based on the W meta-dataset.
Figure 2 plots the partial estimate of the payo of contradicting own signal against the proportion
of choices contradicting own signal for observations where sitcount(E;ht;st) > 10. Black bubbles have
x-values given by partial estimates of the payo of contradicting own signal, y-values given by associated
proportions of choices contradicting own signal, and sizes which re
ect sitcount(E;ht;st). The red line
is the tted line of a weighted OLS regression which includes an intercept, and linear, squared, and cubed
terms of the partial estimate of the payo of contradicting own signal.
Note: 358 distinct values of (E;ht;st) and 16,022 individual observations in total.
FIGURE 2: Proportion of Contradicting Own Signal
The shape of the tted line shows that on average participants do not optimally respond to the
underlying incentives. For empirical payos slightly larger than 0.5, participants' choices cannot be best
responses to rational expectations since the majority of choices should contradict own signal. This is
conrmed by the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true correspondence between the payo of
contradicting own signal and its frequency goes through (0.5, 0.5) at any conventional level.6 In line
with W's qualitative ndings, we observe that participants quite often fail to contradict their signal in
decision situations where it is benecial to do so though they (almost) always follow their signal in the
complementary set of decision situations.
However, the systematic tendency of participants to follow their signal, relative to the benchmark of
6The hypothesis that participants exhibit a correct perception of the payo of actions is also rejected when using an
instrumental variable approach which addresses the measurement error problem. Details about the regression results and
the statistical tests are to be found in Appendix E.
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an empirical payo of contradicting own signal equal to 0.61 whereas W reports a crossing payo of 0.68.
Additionally, averaging across all observations where the empirical payo is strictly greater than 1=2, we
nd that the relative frequency of optimal choice is 0.60 compared to W's reported frequency of 0.44 (for
the observations in the left-half of the gure, the optimal choice occurs with a relative frequency of 0.92).
Also in contrast with W, we nd that participants leave comparable amounts of money on the table
in situations where they should contradict their signal and in situations where they should follow their
signal. Participants receive 0.87 and 0.93 of what they could have earned from making the optimal choice
in the former and latter situations, respectively. We therefore conclude that participants are moderately
successful in learning from others.
We also partially disagree with W's conclusions about the decision situations in which participants are
disproportionately worse in making the correct inferences. On the one hand, we conrm that in decision
situations where participants observe previous choices which contradict their signal their frequency of
making the empirically optimal choice is signicantly lower, even when the incentives are controlled for.
On the other hand, we do not conrm that, holding incentives constant, participants are more successful
in learning from others when the accumulated evidence from previous choices is strong and unambiguous.
Our improved measure of the success of social learning indicates that participants make better inferences
along equilibrium-path histories not because the public information is easy to interpret but because it is
more valuable.
4 Concluding Remarks
The comment provides evidence against using the full estimate of the payo of actions to test rational
expectations in information cascade experiments. When relying on the true values of the prior and
signal qualities to estimate the payo of actions, we conrm W's nding that the rational expectations
hypothesis is rejected. We also show that participants are moderately successful in learning from others
and that the fraction of optimal choice earnings they receive is comparable in situations where they should
follow others and in situations where they should follow private information.
W rightly concludes that estimating the payo of actions and controlling for it in regressions that
describe behavior can be used to test rational expectations in any experimental game. To ensure the valid-
ity of the test in experimental games with state uncertainty (e.g. experimental auctions or experimental
stock markets), we claim that the empirical payo of actions should incorporate the true parameter values
of the information structure whenever the latter is public knowledge.
W also concludes that meta-analyses are well suited for testing rational expectations with the reduced-
form approach. Though we agree that a meta-dataset comprises a large variety of decision situations, we
note that estimates of the payo of actions are computed at the treatment level. Since the empirical payo
of actions is measured with high precision only in treatments with many observations, either few studies
are included in the analysis or large sampling errors are present. As a complement to meta-analyses,
we argue in favor of experiments which allow participants to experience plenty of decision situations
and generate a large dataset. Along these lines, March, Kr ugel, and Ziegelmeyer (2012) collect (almost)
20,000 observations to measure the success of social learning in a single information cascade experiment,
and they observe that participants' biased tendency to follow own signal is almost non-existent.
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